Beyond the Dilemma of Difference:
The Capability Approach to Disability
and Special Educational Needs
LORELLA TERZI
In her recent pamphlet Special Educational Needs: a new look
(2005) Mary Warnock has called for a radical review of
special needs education and a substantial reconsideration
of the assumptions upon which the current educational
framework is based. The latter, she maintains, is hindered by a
contradiction between the intention to treat all learners as the
same and that of responding adequately to the needs arising
from their individual differences. The tension highlighted
by Warnock, which is central to the debate in special and
inclusive education, is also referred to as the ‘dilemma of
difference’. This consists in the seemingly unavoidable choice
between, on the one hand, identifying children’s differences in
order to provide for them differentially, with the risk of
labelling and dividing, and, on the other, accentuating the
‘sameness’ and offering common provision, with the risk of
not making available what is relevant to, and needed by,
individual children. In this paper, I argue that the capability
approach developed by Amartya Sen provides an innovative
and important perspective for re-examining the dilemma of
difference in significant ways. In particular, I maintain that
reconceptualising disability and special needs through the
capability approach makes possible the overcoming of the
tension at the core of the dilemma of difference, whilst at the
same time inscribing the debate within an ethical, normative
framework based upon justice and equality.
INTRODUCTION
The publication in 1978 of the Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the
Education of Handicapped Children and Young People, known as the
Warnock Report (DES, 1978), marked a watershed in the educational
provision for disabled learners in the UK, whilst at the same time
establishing a new fundamental framework for special education. The
Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 39, No. 3, 2005
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Report importantly highlighted the commonality of educational aims for
all children, irrespective of their abilities or disabilities, and introduced the
concept of ‘special educational needs’ in order to identify learners who
experience difficulties at any time during their schooling. Further, it
recognised disabled learners’ entitlement to be educated in mainstream
schools, providing their needs could be met with additional support, thus
opening the way to the idea of inclusion (Riddell, 2002, p. 6; Warnock,
2005, p. 18).
Recently, and more than thirty years after the publication of the Report
and the enactment of its recommendations through the 1981 Education
Act,1 Baroness Mary Warnock, the then chair of the Committee, has called
for a radical review of special needs education. In her pamphlet Special
Educational Needs: A New Look Warnock argues for a substantial
reconsideration of the assumptions upon which the current educational
framework is based. The latter, she maintains, is hindered by a contradiction between the intention to treat all learners the same and that of
responding adequately to the needs arising from their individual differences (Warnock, 2005, p. 11).
The tension highlighted by Warnock is indeed central to the debate
in special and inclusive education, where it is also referred to as the
‘dilemma of difference’. The dilemma of difference consists in the
seemingly unavoidable choice between, on the one hand, identifying
children’s differences in order to provide for them differentially, with
the risk of labelling and dividing, and, on the other hand, accentuating
‘sameness’ and offering common provision, with the risk of not making
available what is relevant to, and needed by, individual children (see
Dyson, 2001; Lunt, 2002; Norwich, 1993, 1994). Subsumed in the
dilemma are two interrelated aspects: a theoretical dimension, concerned
with issues of conceptualisation and definition, and a political one, which
refers to questions of provision in order to meet the equal entitlements of
all children to education.
Conceptualising differences among children, and in particular differences related to disability and special needs, is a complex educational
problem. What counts as disability and special needs, and how this relates
to learning difficulties, is not only still much debated in education but also
the subject of contrasting and often opposed views. The debate is
characterised, on the one hand, by positions that see disability and special
needs as caused by individual limitations and deficits, and, on the other, by
positions that see disability and special needs as caused by the limitations
and deficits of the schooling systems in accommodating the diversity of
children. A further crucial aspect of this debate concerns the use, in
general terms, of classificatory systems for educational purposes and the
use, more specifically, of classification in relation to disabled students.
The debate on this issue tends to be polarised between, on the one side,
perspectives that endorse the use of categories and classification systems
seen as necessary to ensure differential and appropriate educational
provision, and, on the other side, perspectives that critically highlight the
possible discriminatory and oppressive use of these systems.
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In this paper, I suggest a possible, initial answer to Warnock’s call for a
reconsideration of the framework informing special and inclusive
education. More specifically, I argue that a philosophical framework,
based on the capability approach as developed by Amartya Sen, provides
an interesting perspective for re-examining the dilemma of difference
in significant ways. The capability approach is a normative framework
for assessing inequality. It claims that social arrangements should be
evaluated in the space of capability, that is, in the space of the real
freedoms people have to promote and achieve their own wellbeing.
Considerations of human diversity in terms of the interrelation between
individual, social and circumstantial factors are central in the evaluation of
people’s capabilities and, therefore, ultimately, of their wellbeing.
How can the capability approach address the tensions at the core of
the dilemma of difference? I maintain that this approach provides an
innovative theoretical and normative framework for re-examining disability and special needs. In particular, reconceptualising disability and
special needs through the capability approach allows the overcoming of
the duality inherent in current understandings, whilst at the same time
inscribing the debate within an ethical, normative framework substantially
aimed at justice and equality. Thus, the capability approach allows the
theorisation of a unified framework that sees the interplay of the
theoretical level of defining disability and special needs in education with
the political level of determining a just educational entitlement.
The paper is divided into three sections. The first section is a critical
summary of current perspectives on disability and special educational
needs. It briefly highlights how the juxtaposition of individual and social
elements as causes of learning difficulties leads to definitions that do not
capture the complexity of disability and special needs. This results in
partial and theoretically limited educational perspectives. The second
section outlines elements of the capability approach. It highlights how this
approach allows for an understanding of disability as the interrelation of
individual and circumstantial elements, thus overcoming the duality of
current perspectives. The final section of the paper reconceptualises
disability and special educational needs through the capability approach
and shows how this approach provides new and fruitful answers to the
definitional part of the dilemma of difference, whilst keeping firmly in
sight the equal educational entitlement of disabled learners as a matter of
justice.
1. CONCEPTUALISING DIFFERENCES IN EDUCATION:
DISABILITY AND SPECIAL EDUCATION NEEDS
Educational approaches to definitions and causes of disability and special
needs, however much they may contrast, can all be substantially subsumed
under different understandings of the relation between children’s diversity
and the school system. The theoretical core of the contention lies not only
in the definition of children’s diversity with respect to school but also, and
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more specifically, in the factors causing the difficulties experienced by
some children either throughout or at any time during their school career.
As I mentioned earlier, the debate is characterised, on the one hand, by
perspectives that causally relate children’s difficulties to their individual
characteristics, often seen as individual limitations and deficits. These
perspectives suggest the adoption of medical categories of disability and
concepts of learning difficulties. On the other hand, other positions,
mainly in sociology of education, locate the causes of children’s learning
difficulties within schooling institutions characterised by their inability to
meet the diversity of children’s learning. While opposing the adoption of
any form of category or classification of children’s differences, seen as
inherently discriminatory, these positions promote instead ‘the recognition
and appreciation of all aspects of diversity in education’ (Barton, 2003,
p. 15).
I maintain that the duality between individual and social elements, an
artificial causal opposition, leads to limited and unsatisfactory conceptualisations of disability and special needs. More specifically, I argue that
perspectives emphasising individual limitations end up overshadowing the
role played by the design of schooling institutions in determining learning
difficulties. Conversely, perspectives that identify schooling factors as
causes of learning difficulties tend to overlook elements related to
individual characteristics. Let me proceed to substantiate these claims.
Perspectives that explain children’s learning difficulties as causally
linked to their personal features adopt concepts of disability as related to
individual impairments. Here the distinction between impairment, seen as
a physiological disorder or limitation, and the related disability, in terms
of restriction of activity, is fundamental. These perspectives rely on the
use of classificatory systems mainly based on medical or psychological
categories—for example, ‘sensory impairments’ or ‘intellectual difficulties’. Categories are seen as part of the ‘attempts to understand learners’
individual characteristics’ (MacKay, 2002, p. 160) and to provide the
specialist support assumed as fundamental to their education. Proponents
of these views criticise perspectives based on the social model of
disability—the model supported by disabled people’s organisations—for
failing to analyse the complexity of disability and for simplifying it under
the ‘neat umbrella of disability’ as socially constructed (MacKay, 2002,
p. 160). For instance, MacKay expresses concern about the fact ‘that many
cohorts of experienced teachers . . . have been taught that impaired hearing
is not a barrier to learning, because real barriers have to be construed
socially’ (ibid.). Whilst agreeing with some terms of this critique of the
social model of disability,2 I maintain that these perspectives present
limits in their understanding of children’s difficulties. Impaired hearing,
to return to the example mentioned, can certainly become in itself a barrier
to learning, and hence a disability, when teaching is not provided to
accommodate children with hearing impairment. If teaching were conducted in diverse ways, for instance by specific methods of facilitating
language development (see, for instance, Gregory, 2005), then hearing
impairment would remain an impairment, but would probably not become
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a disability, thus not resulting in a barrier to learning. As I shall explain
in more detail later on, a disability is relational both to impairments
and to the design of educational arrangements. In particular, impairments
become disabilities—that is, functional limitations—in certain educational
arrangements but not in others. Consequently, a disability implies impairment, but the opposite does not hold in all cases. This distinction is subtle
but worth making. Ultimately, what this example shows is how categorybased positions end up emphasising the ‘individual’ aspect of the relation
between children’s difficulties and school, thus seriously overlooking the
relevance of the schooling factor in determining learning difficulties and,
therefore, failing to express the complexity of determining what kind of
difference is to count as a learning disability.
Similar considerations apply to the concept of special educational needs,
as this was adopted in the UK following the Warnock Report (DES, 1978)
and the 1981 Education Act (see above). Whilst aiming at emphasising the
relational aspect of learning difficulties, and bringing the theory and
practice of special education beyond the use of categories, the concept of
special educational needs not only remains inscribed in a ‘within-child
model’, but also substantially introduces a new category, that of special
needs. This category still presents special needs as essential to the
individual child and de facto separates children with special needs from
others (Norwich, 1993, p. 45). Furthermore, the concept of special educational needs appears theoretically unspecified and practically
unworkable. This leads, on the one hand, to a conceptual proliferations of
needs—for instance, in ideas of exceptional needs, defined as ‘arising
from characteristics shared by some, e.g. visual impairment, high musical
ability’ (Norwich, 1996, p. 34), or notions of ‘individual needs’ (Ainscow,
1989), related to the full and irreducible diversity of individuals. On
the other hand, the unspecified nature of the concept leads to the
reintroduction of the medical and psychological categories it aimed
to abolish, like ‘sensory impairment’ or ‘emotional and behavioural
difficulties’. Ultimately, therefore, the notion of special needs remains
conceptually a ‘within-child model’ and fails to capture the complexity of
disability.
Let us now consider those perspectives that identify the learning
difficulties experienced by some children as related to the limitations of
the schooling systems in meeting their diversity. These perspectives hold
the view that it is indeed how schools deal with the issue of difference that
determines the correlation between diversity and difficulties. In this sense,
disabilities and special needs are considered wholly socially constructed,
thus neither inherent nor essential to the child.
For some educationalists (for example, Tony Booth, Alan Dyson)
difficulties and needs are caused by the inflexibility of the school system
and by its inability to meet the diversity of children. It is, therefore, the
limitation of schooling that causes special educational needs. Brahm
Norwich notes that, although on this view difficulties are seen as arising
from the relation between the diversity of children and the school system,
critical attention is specifically directed only to the limitations of the
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school rather than to a comprehensive understanding of how this relation
takes place. In this sense, for instance, Dyson comments: ‘Special needs
are not the needs that arise in a child with disabilities with regard to a
system that is fixed. Rather they are needs that arise between the child and
the educational system as a whole when the system fails to adapt itself to
the characteristics of the child’ (Dyson, cited in Norwich, 1993, p. 50). As
Norwich has rightly pointed out, there seems to be an inconsistency in
arguing for an interaction between child and school, and then asserting
only the limitations on the part of the school (Norwich, 1993, p. 50).
Some sociologists of education influenced by the social model of
disability maintain that disability and special needs in education are
socially constructed in the sense of being the products of disabling barriers
and of exclusionary and oppressive educational processes (see Armstrong,
Barnes, Barton, Corbett, Oliver, Tomlinson). They see disabilities and
difficulties as caused by institutional practices, which marginalise and
discriminate through the use of labelling procedures and disabling
categories and methods. These positions criticise the use of categories
of disability for their arbitrary, socially situated and discriminatory use.
The use of categories is seen as aimed at separating and, until recently,
segregating children on the basis of their presumed ‘abnormality’, and as
labelling and devaluing disabled children and children with special needs.
Consequently, and in line with the social model of disability, according to
proponents of this perspective, ‘difference is not a euphemism for defect,
for abnormality, for a problem to be worked out through technical and
assimilationist education policies. Diversity is a social fact’ (Armstrong
and Barton, 2000, p. 34). Differences and diversity, therefore, instead of
constituting a ‘dilemma’, have to be promoted and celebrated.
I argue that this position, while highlighting possible limits of medical
and social practices of categorisation, nevertheless involves relevant
theoretical problems. First, stating that difficulties and disability in
education are socially constructed betrays obvious and exaggerated
assumptions regarding socialisation and significantly overlooks the
individual factors related to impairments. To resume the example
mentioned above, a hearing impairment has to be recognised and
acknowledged if provision is to be made in order to avoid educational
barriers. Hence, simply stating that individual differences have to be
celebrated does not seem to be a sufficient basis upon which to determine
the ends of educating the child, and even less so when the aim is the
enactment of equal educational entitlements. This becomes more evident
in the case of severely disabled children or children with multiple
disabilities. Second, the abandonment of any use of categories and
classifications of disability and special needs in favour of a generic
celebration of differences is in itself a problematic and, to a certain extent,
counterproductive position. How can policies be designed to celebrate
differences, and specifically differences related to impairment and
disability, in the absence of any specification of the concept of difference?
Ultimately, therefore, educational perspectives that advocate the abandonment of categories of disability and special needs and assert that they are
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solely socially constructed seriously overlook the relevance of individual
factors and the importance of the relation between the latter and the design
of schooling systems in determining learning difficulties.
Let us now recap the main elements of the educational debate on
disability and special needs addressed so far. Positions in education can be
identified in terms of the contrast between, on the one hand, asserting that
difficulties are caused by factors essential to the individual child and, on
the other, maintaining that they are caused by the limitations of schools
and by institutional barriers. As we have seen, the opposition between
individual and social elements presents consistent theoretical limits, which
are mainly related to the assumptions of unilateral causality and of a fixed
dichotomy that are made. According to Norwich, ‘Individual difficulty
versus the organizational inflexibility is a false causal opposition. The
social and the individual are not exclusive alternatives between which
causal accounts are chosen. We need accounts which can accommodate
the individual personal with the social organizational’ (Norwich, 1993,
p. 20). I maintain that the capability approach, where individual personal
and social organisational can be accounted for in their interaction,
provides exactly such a normative framework. The next section outlines
the constitutive elements of the capability approach. It shows how this
approach opens the understanding and theorisation of impairment and
disability to an important, relational dimension.
2. RE-CONCEPTUALISING DISABILITY:
THE CAPABILITY APPROACH3
The capability approach is a normative framework for the assessment of
poverty, inequality and the design of social institutions. It provides
an answer to the ‘equality of what’ question, which is central to debates
in political philosophy and, specifically, in liberal egalitarianism, and
concerns what elements social institutions and policies should aim to
equalise. Closely linked to the ‘equality of what’ question are two further
issues: first, the choice of the space in which to assess equality and,
second, the kind of measurement that should be used in comparing
people’s relative advantages and disadvantages.
The capability approach argues that equality and social arrangements
should be evaluated in terms of the theoretical space of capabilities, that
is, in the space of the real freedoms people have to achieve the valued
functionings that are constitutive of their well-being. It maintains that,
rather than the means to freedom, what is fundamental in assessing
equality is the extent of people’s freedom to choose among valuable
functionings. Functionings are the beings and doings that individuals
have reason to value. Walking, reading, being well nourished, being
educated, having self-respect or acting in one’s political capacity are all
examples of functionings. Capabilities are the real opportunities and
freedoms people have to achieve these valued functionings. Capabilities
are, therefore, potential functionings or, as Sen says, ‘various combinations
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of functionings (beings and doings) that the person can achieve. Capability
is, thus, a set of vectors of functionings, reflecting the person’s freedom to
lead one type of life or another . . . to choose from possible livings’ (Sen,
1992, p. 40). Sen provides a useful example that helps us to understand the
distinction between functionings and capability by comparing the situation
of a starving person to that of someone fasting (p. 111). Clearly the person
starving is deprived of the capability—that is, the real effective freedom—
of choosing whether to eat or to fast, whereas the person who fasts retains
her freedom to choose, and hence she has the relevant capability. For the
capability approach, what is fundamental in the assessment of equality is
‘what people are actually able to be and to do’ (Nussbaum, 2000, p. 40),
and hence the sets of capabilities available to them, rather than the sets of
achieved functionings they can enjoy at any given time. The focus of the
capability approach is, therefore, on the real effective freedoms people
have and on their choice among possible bundles of functionings.
Ultimately this allows for the pursuit of people’s individual well-being
and facilitates their life-planning on the basis of individual choice
(Robeyns, 2003).
Capabilities, as we have seen, constitute the space for assessing and
seeking equality. The evaluation of equality, however, and the comparisons of individuals’ relative advantages and disadvantages within this
space entail the use of some kind of measurement. Fundamental to
the capability metric is the centrality of human diversity. Sen claims,
‘Human diversity is no secondary complication (to be ignored, or to be
introduced ‘‘later on’’); it is a fundamental aspect of our interest in
equality’ (Sen, 1992, xi). According to Sen, human beings are diverse in
three fundamental ways. First, they are different with respect to personal
characteristics such as gender, age, physical and mental abilities, talents,
proneness to illness, and so forth. Second, individuals are different with
respect to external circumstances, such as inherited wealth and assets,
environmental factors including climatic differences, and social and
cultural arrangements (pp. 1, 20, 27–28). Third, and fundamentally, they
are different in terms of their ability to convert resources into valued
functionings (p. 85). For example, a lactating woman, due to her specific
condition, needs a higher intake of food for her functionings than a similar
but non-lactating woman. The variations entailed by these differences are
central to the capability metric and have to be accounted for when
addressing the demands of equality. I maintain that this intrinsic interest in
human heterogeneity thus defined is crucial for re-examining impairment,
disability and special needs within a concern for justice. (I say more on
this below.)
Let me now summarise. I have so far outlined two fundamental
elements of the capability approach—namely, the space for the assessment
of people’s well-being, identified in the space of capability, and the metric
for interpersonal comparisons, which entails a specific understanding of
human diversity. The capability approach, as we have seen, identifies
capability with overall freedom, the substantive opportunities people have
to choose the life they have reason to value, and identifies functionings
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with achieved freedoms. Sen’s approach specifies this particular space as
the space where it is possible not only to evaluate but also to seek equality,
and he theorises equality in terms of the extent of the freedom of
individuals.
What does Sen’s capability approach offer to the understanding of
impairment and disability? I maintain that it provides two main insights.
The first, which draws on Sen’s specific understanding of personal
heterogeneities, concerns how we can think of impairment and disability
as aspects of human diversity. This raises considerations concerning the
relational aspect of disability, with respect both to impairment and to
social institutions. The second fundamental insight concerns the centrality
of human diversity in the evaluation of people’s relative advantages or
disadvantages, which thus entails the evaluation of disability in relation to
the distributive patterns of relevant freedoms and hence ultimately in
terms of justice. These insights constitute an important framework for
reconceptualising impairment and disability. This framework is innovative
with respect to current understandings in that it allows the overcoming
of the duality between individual and social models of disability and
sees disability instead as inherently relational. Furthermore, and more
fundamentally, this approach inscribes the understanding of the relation
between impairment, disability and the design of social arrangements in
an ethical framework, where the just entitlement of disabled people is
evaluated in terms of their effective freedoms—that is, their capabilities
for well-being. But let me now proceed to substantiate these claims.
The first fundamental insight provided by the capability approach for
the reconceptualisation of disability relates to its specific and complex
understanding of human heterogeneity as encompassing personal, external
and circumstantial elements, including the individual differential conversion of resources into valuable functionings. This allows for a
conceptualisation of disability as emerging precisely from the interlocking
of these personal, social and circumstantial factors. This conceptualisation, furthermore, sees disability as relational both with respect to
impairment and to the design of social arrangements. Let us see why.
Impairment, on this understanding, is a personal feature that becomes a
disability—an inability to perform some significant class of functionings
on average performed by someone’s reference group under common
circumstances (Buchanan, 2000, p. 286)—when it interacts with specific
social and environmental structures. Disability is, therefore, relational
both with respect to impairment and to the design of social institutions. In
this sense, for example, a visual impairment becomes a disability in
relation to the specific functioning of reading text messages on computer
screens when and if no use of Braille displays and speech output screen
readers is provided (Perry et al., 1996, p. 4). In this case, although the
visual impairment is not overcome, the functioning of reading messages
on screens is, nevertheless, achieved through an alternative functioning
made possible by the adjustment of the environmental design. Consider
also the case of a hearing impaired person who has lost the hearing
functioning in a certain range of frequencies of sounds that is on average
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detected by people. If the range of sounds undetectable by the impaired
person is irrelevant to the functionings in that person’s social environment,
then she is not a disabled person4 (Buchanan, 2000, p. 287). Consider,
finally, the possibility of designing cars where the functioning of seeing is
played, say, by a computerised device. In this case, a visually impaired
person would be able to drive; and hence her impairment would not result
in a disability for that specific functioning. True, this person would still be
able to choose only to drive a certain type of car, due to her impairment,
but the opportunity of achieving the relevant functioning of driving would
still be available. Consequently, whether impairments do or do not result
in disability depends both on the possible overcoming of the impairment
itself and on the specific design of the social and physical environment.
What these examples aim to show, ultimately, is that within a capability
framework, disability is seen as inherently relational, both with respect to
impairment and to social arrangements. Furthermore, the capability
approach provides a specific conception of disability as one aspect of
human heterogeneity, without suggesting monolithic and direct notions
of diversity as abnormality. And this appears to be fundamental
in overcoming the discrimination and oppression denounced by disabled
people’s movements as inherent to current categories of normality,
abnormality and diversity.
The second insight into the capability approach’s innovative potential
with respect to current understandings of disability relates to the centrality
of human diversity in assessing equality in the space of capability. In
repositioning human diversity as central to the evaluation of individual
advantages and disadvantages, Sen’s capability approach promotes an
egalitarian perspective that differs from others in that it deals at its core
with the complexity of disability. Sen’s concept of human diversity, as we
have seen, suggests a conceptualisation of disability as emerging from
the interlocking of personal, social and circumstantial factors. This
enables the overcoming of current understandings of impairment and
disability as biologically or socially determined in a unilateral way.5
Moreover, the capability approach promotes an egalitarian perspective in
which entitlement does not depend on the causal origin of disability. Thus,
in capability terms, whether a disability is biologically or socially caused
as such does not matter. What matters is the scope of the full set of
capabilities one person can choose from and the role that impairment and
disability play in this set of freedoms. Ultimately, the capability approach
provides an egalitarian framework where disability is evaluated in the
light of the distributive pattern of relevant capability (see Terzi, 2005,
p. 209). This has fundamental consequences for the design of social
policies and institutions, and consequently has fundamental implications
for the design of educational policies and schooling systems.
An example may help in illustrating these insights. Consider, for
instance, the functioning of reading and how it enables more complex
functionings, like accessing written information, or communicating via
electronic mail, thus allowing the performance of a wide range of
tasks, including, for instance, the possibility of working in an office
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environment. Now consider the situation of a visually impaired person
who uses Braille resources. In determining the full set of capabilities that a
Braille user has to achieve her valued ends, the capability approach looks
at how this specific functioning, reading Braille, interacts with
circumstantial factors, such as the physical environment where the person
lives and the presence of Braille resources and output speech devices, and
how it interacts with personal conversion factors, such as her general
strength and attitudes. This approach also considers the interplay between
Braille use and the ends that the person values, one of which could, for
example, be working in an office. The capability approach allows us to say
that being a visually impaired person in relation to certain functionings is a
disadvantage when the specific resources are not provided or the physical
environment is not designed appropriately. The provision of Braille
resources and the appropriate design of the environment are matters of
justice on the capability approach, because these contribute to the equalisation of the capability to pursue and achieve individual well-being (ibid.).
Ultimately, the two insights outlined so far provide a fundamental
framework for reconceptualising impairment and disability within the
capability approach. They allow for a complex relational understanding of
impairment, disability, and social and physical structures. This takes the
theorisation on these issues beyond the dualism of individual and social
elements inherent in current positions. Furthermore, it provides an alternative conceptualisation of impairment and disability. In what follows, I
shall outline some (provisional) elements of a capability perspective on
disability.
Reconceptualising impairment and disability within the capability
approach implies reframing these concepts in terms of functionings and
capabilities. Impairment is a personal feature that may affect certain
functionings and, therefore, become a disability. Consequently, disability
is a restriction of functionings. This is the result of the interlocking of
personal with social and circumstantial features. Since functionings are
constitutive of a person’s being, and capability represents the various
combinations of functionings that a person can achieve, hence her freedom
to choose one type of life or another (Sen, 1992, pp. 39–40), a restriction
in functionings results in a restriction of the set of functionings available
to the person. Consequently, it results in a narrower range of capability.
Ultimately, within this framework, disability is conceptualised as a
limitation on relevant capabilities and is seen in its relational aspect,
both with respect to impairment and to the design of environmental and
social arrangements. In this sense, disability is evaluated as a ‘vertical
inequality’, or as a kind of difference that, in affecting the individual set of
valuable capabilities, and unlike a ‘horizontal inequality’ such as
the colour of one’s eyes (Pogge, 2003), has to be addressed as a matter of justice. Hence, rethinking impairment and disability in terms
of capabilities implies considering what the full sets of capabilities one
person can choose from are and evaluating the impact of impairment on
these sets of freedoms. It implies, moreover, considering the interface
between the individual and the environmental characteristics in assessing
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what circumstantial elements may lead impairment to become disability
and how this impacts on capabilities. In this sense, impairment and
disability are elements to be accounted for both in theories of justice and
in social policy when considering what a person is actually able to be
and to do.
On the basis of the above, I suggest then that this conceptualisation of
disability in terms of capability has important theoretical and normative
implications for education. The next section applies elements of the
capability approach to the ‘dilemma of difference’.
3. BEYOND THE DILEMMA OF DIFFERENCE: THE CAPABILITY
APPROACH IN EDUCATION
In this final section I argue that reframing the dilemma of difference
through the capability approach can bring forward the theorisation of what
counts as disability in education and provide a framework that not only
overrides unilateral understandings but also fundamentally considers the
dilemma in terms of justice. Let me now proceed to substantiate these
claims.
As we have seen, the dilemma of difference consists in the identification
and recognition of children’s diversity in relation to education and
schooling systems while aiming at appropriate, additional provision in
order to educate all children. It consists in considering learning difficulties
as emerging from the relationship between the individual child and the
schooling system. How can the capability perspective address this dilemma in significant ways? I maintain that it can do this in two substantial
ways: first, by actually reconsidering the dilemma through concepts of
functioning and capability, and with reference to the capability metric—
hence, by substantially conceptualising the relational aspect of disability
both to impairment and to schooling factors; second, by rethinking
disability and learning difficulties themselves through the concepts of
functionings and capability, and within the framework entailed by these
concepts in their contextualisation in education.
Let me start by reframing the dilemma of difference within the
capability perspective. Disability, as has been shown, results in capability
limitation and is relational both to impairments and to the design of social
arrangements. More specifically, impairments affect functionings and
become disability under certain conditions but not under others—hence,
disability implies impairment, but the reverse, as argued above, does not
necessarily hold. I shall now apply this perspective to education.
Consider, for instance, dyslexia. Dyslexia may considerably affect
the achievement of basic functionings such as reading and writing, and
hence it may result in a consistent limitation of immediate functioning achievements and of future capabilities. In this sense, dyslexia is an
individual disadvantage in certain aspects of education—namely, all those
related to literacy where the individual may experience ‘learning
difficulties’. Yet when the educational environment is appropriately
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designed to address the learning modalities of a dyslexic individual and
the individual is receptive to it, this potential restriction in functionings
may not become a disability and thus not be a realised functioning
restriction. The capability framework looks precisely at this relational
aspect of how the individual child interacts with her schooling
environment and how she converts resources into functionings whilst at
the same time considering how the environment is designed. In this sense,
no emphasis is placed on within-child factors over educational factors, or
vice versa, since the focus of the framework is on the interaction between
the two elements. In this sense, moreover, no unilateral causal relation is
established between individual or indeed circumstantial features and
disability or learning difficulties. Furthermore, this approach takes into
account not only the interaction but also the complexity of both
dimensions, individual and circumstantial, as these elements are part of
the metric proposed by the approach. Finally, the capability approach
highlights how the potential limitation in functioning entailed by
impairment related to dyslexia has to be addressed as a matter of justice,
since this contributes to the equalization of the individual’s capability to
achieve well-being.
In view of these considerations, let us now analyse how the capability
metric evaluates, for instance, dyslexia in relation to education.6 Dyslexia,
as seen, impairs reading and writing functionings, and in this sense a child
with dyslexia is disadvantaged in certain aspects of her education when
compared to a non-dyslexic child. Since being literate has intrinsically and
instrumentally important values, dyslexia limits the achievement not only
of reading and writing functionings but also of prospective relevant
capabilities. Consequently, dyslexia is considered a difference that, in
affecting functionings, constitutes an identifiable disadvantage. Is it an
absolute disadvantage? No, it is relational with respect to the design of
educational systems. Suppose, for example, that there is an educational
system completely based on visual arts curricula. In such an education,
dyslexia would certainly have a very different impact from the one it has
on literacy-based systems. Furthermore, dyslexia is a relational limitation
in a second sense also, in that literacy based systems can and indeed have
to provide specifically and appropriately for it. The capability metric
provides this fundamental insight. It highlights, furthermore, how
additional and appropriate provision in the case of dyslexia, as with any
other restriction of functioning and capability, becomes a matter of justice.
Moreover, it is in terms not of assistance but of equality in the space of
capability that differential resources are due.7
Let me now, in addition to the case of dyslexia, focus on the
reconsideration of other learning difficulties in the light of the concepts
of functionings and capability within specific educational frameworks.
In so doing, I analyse two more ‘categories’—namely, physical disability
(sensory impairment in terms of hearing impairment) and severe learning
difficulties.
Understanding hearing impairment involves looking at how it impacts
on related functionings and capabilities sets within education. Hearing
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enables basic functionings such as, for instance, listening and communicating. These functionings, whilst being fundamental to all dimensions
of learning, play a specific role—for example, in language acquisition.
Hence, prima facie, a complete hearing loss, as in the case of deafness,
significantly restricts basic functionings and relevant capabilities. There
may, however, be a second way of considering hearing impairment and of
looking at its specific ramifications with regard to education. We need to
introduce here the concept of alternative functioning or of doing the same
thing in different ways. It is widely recognised that deaf people can
effectively ‘listen’ to vocal messages by way of ‘lip-reading’ and that they
can communicate through sign language. For example, in the community
of Martha’s Vineyard, the wider population commonly and effectively
adopted both English and sign language, learning them from infancy and
thus virtually allowing the communicative functionings of the deaf group
of the community to be exercised (Ree, 2000, p. 201). Yet our social
arrangements are not designed like Martha’s Vineyard and are instead
based almost exclusively on vocal languages. Without exploring here the
reasons and the implications of such arrangements, it is worth considering
the concept of alternative functioning in education. In this sense education
can play a significant role in expanding capabilities for deaf children while
providing for the functionings, including the alternative functionings, that
they can achieve. In this sense, many hearing impaired people are
effectively competent in terms of the understanding, if not in terms of the
production, of two languages. How does the capability metric compare
‘normal’ functionings to alternative ones? It considers functioning in
alternative ways a personal feature, which stands as a vertical inequality,
as we have seen above, with respect to the functional demands of
dominant educational arrangements. The same consideration extends to
other physical and sensory impairments.
Considering severe learning difficulties entails a more complex
situation. Severe learning difficulties refer to a potentially wider limitation
in functionings, from basics to more complex ones, hence in relevant and
substantial capability limitations. Basic functionings such as independent
mobility and communication can be limited, as can functionings such
as the exercise of choice. In this sense a child with severe learning
difficulties, given the complex characteristics of contemporary educational
systems, is at a considerable disadvantage. Here again, severe learning
difficulties constitute a vertical inequality, which the capability framework
highlights in its relational aspect to the design of educational systems.
Let me now try to provide a first answer to the question of what counts
as disability in education. Seen within a capability framework, disability
is a restriction in functioning achievements, such as those analysed in the
previous examples, which relates to the design of educational systems. In
the light of the specific role of education in expanding capabilities, a
child’s limitations in functioning result in a restriction of the child’s future
capabilities. In this sense, the capability metric highlights disability as
a vertical inequality when compared to non-disability, or as a kind of
difference that, in limiting functionings, has to be addressed and provided
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for as a matter of justice. These, I maintain, are important and fundamental
insights implied by conceptualising disability and special needs within the
capability approach.
CONCLUSION
Conceptualising differences among children, and specifically differences
entailed by disability and special needs, is a difficult educational problem.
I have argued in this paper that current understandings of disability and
special needs are constructed on the basis of a dualism between individual
and social factors. This is a dualism that does not capture the complexity
of the matter and that leads instead to accounts of disability that are partial
and limited. I have suggested that the capability approach provides a new
and important framework for reconceptualising impairment, disability and
special needs. This entails, on the one hand, a conceptualisation of
disability as inherently relational and, on the other, the reconsideration of
questions concerning the definition of difference among children within a
fundamental normative framework aimed at justice and equality.
Let us now conclude. The capability approach is a framework of
thought, not an educational theory. Nevertheless, in helping to reconcile
the dualism and the tensions inherent in current understandings
and models of disability and special educational needs, and in positioning
people’s capabilities and the achievement of their well-being as central,
the capability approach opens, I believe, the way to an innovative and
helpful framework for re-examining special needs education, and education more generally.8
Correspondence: Lorella Terzi, School of Education, Roehampton
University, Roehampton Lane, London SW15 5PU.
Email: [email protected]
NOTES
1. The 1981 Education Act has since been superseded by the 1993 Education Act, the 1996
Education Act, and the 2001 Special Educational Needs and Disability Act. It was, however, the
1981 Education Act that mainly set the framework for the current provision in special and
inclusive education (Norwich, 2002, p. 485).
2. For an extensive critique of the social model of disability, see Terzi, 2004.
3. This section draws on Terzi, 2005a.
4. This, however, raises the question of considering the person’s capabilities, and hence the
functionings she may wish to have. What if this limitation, although not relevant in her dominant
social framework, still hinders the person’s set of valuable beings and doings? Here the discussion
leads to the aspect of preference formation and the influence of processes of ambition-affecting
socialisation that are problematic aspects of the capability approach. Some of these problems have
been effectively addressed, albeit within a different framework and for different purposes, in
Arneson, 1999. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this connection.
5. I owe this insight to discussions with Harry Brighouse.
6. These and following considerations draw on Brighouse and Unterhalter, 2003.
7. I have extensively analysed and discussed this argument in Terzi, 2005b. See also Terzi, 2005c.
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8. I am very grateful to Harry Brighouse and Terence McLaughlin for invaluable support, and also to
two anonymous referees and the editor for their critical and helpful comments. This paper was
presented at the Third Anglo-American Symposium on Special Education and School Reform,
Cambridge, 9–12 June 2004. I would like to thank Dr. Lani Florian for inviting me to take part in
the Symposium and the participants for insightful and useful comments. Further valuable
comments were received at the BERA 2004 Annual Conference. Finally, I gratefully acknowledge
the generous research funding provided by the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain.
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