2. What does Skinner mean when he says that the products of science are not the same thing as science itself?
What does Skinner mean when he says that the products of science are not the same thing as science itself?
Introduction
The problem of demarcation is the problem of how to distinguish between science, on the one hand, and its products (such as scientific knowledge), on the other. Within science itself, it’s clear that there are many different fields of study with their own distinctive sorts of questions and methods. But what about outside science? If we want to distinguish between these fields — say if we’re talking about engineering vs. physics or biology vs. psychology — how do we know where one begins and one ends? How do we decide which questions are legitimate indeed worthy of being answered by scientists rather than others? Skinner thinks this question can be answered by looking at how scientists themselves have traditionally answered it: by claiming that their particular type of inquiry somehow marks them off from everyone else…
The problem of demarcation is the problem of how to distinguish between science, on the one hand, and its products (such as scientific knowledge), on the other.
The problem of demarcation is the problem of how to distinguish between science, on the one hand, and its products (such as scientific knowledge).
It’s not just about whether Skinner is correct in his general criticism of science; it also has something to do with whether we should be using the term “science” at all.
The myth of demarcation is the myth that there is a sharp distinction between the sciences and the rest of life, that the former is pure while the latter is impure.
The myth of demarcation is the myth that there is a sharp distinction between the sciences and the rest of life, that the former is pure while the latter is impure. In this way, it provides an authoritarian justification for imposing one’s own beliefs on others and restricting their freedom.
The problem with this view is that science isn’t so simple: it encompasses many different kinds of knowledge-gathering methods (observational, experimental etc.) which then lead to different kinds of knowledge production (factual/technical etc.). It’s this idea that led Skinner to reject any attempt to draw hard lines between science and non-science with regard to their validity or worthiness as modes of inquiry into nature or our place within it.
Demarcation theory originated as an attempt by scientists to justify their claim to be distinct from other sorts of people by emphasizing their uniqueness and specialness.
Demarcation theory originated as an attempt by scientists to justify their claim to be distinct from other sorts of people by emphasizing their uniqueness and specialness. The first use of the term “demarcation” appeared in 1878, when Karl Pearson, who was interested in how psychology could improve medicine and health care, wrote a paper titled “On the Distinction between Scientific Psychology and Everyday Thought.” He argued that there should be a clear distinction between scientific psychology–which he defined as “a more exact knowledge of the laws governing mental phenomena–and everyday thought.”
In order to justify this distinction, Pearson proposed that there were two types of people: those who do research (scientists), versus those who simply observe what happens around them (laypeople). According to him, only scientists can properly understand things like intelligence or personality traits because they have access directly through measurement into these realms–whereas laypeople must rely on observation alone without an understanding of underlying causes or mechanisms at work within each individual case being studied.
The idea that science is somehow more real or valid than other human pursuits has been at the core of many authoritarian systems over time.
It’s a common belief that science, especially when it comes to the study of human behavior, can help justify authoritarian systems. This is because many scientists have been willing to use their knowledge of human behavior in order to justify these systems and make them seem more “real” or “valid.”
For example, during the Cold War era when the Soviet Union was dominating Eastern Europe and testing nuclear weapons on its citizens–and even on some animals–many Western scientists supported these actions by claiming that they were necessary for the safety and security of all citizens; they believed these tests would keep everyone safe from harm! In other words they were helping justify such practices by saying something like “this is how things really work!”
Skinner thinks that demarcation theory can be used to justify the claims made by scientists about their own field — i.e., claims about what counts as “science” — only if we accept their claim that it’s possible for any sort of person (including scientists) to have valid insights into nature.)
Skinner thinks that demarcation theory can be used to justify the claims made by scientists about their own field — i.e., claims about what counts as “science” — only if we accept their claim that it’s possible for any sort of person (including scientists) to have valid insights into nature.)
Skinner argues that this assumption is mistaken: no one has any special access to scientific truth and goodness; all human beings are fallible, so even if someone has had a genuinely insightful thought about some aspect of reality, they may not have any idea what they’re talking about.
Skinner’s understanding of this problem requires a kind of humility about our ability to understand ourselves scientifically and about our ability to know what is “good” or “valid” in terms of science itself rather than relying on some grand narrative about how it happened
Skinner’s understanding of this problem requires a kind of humility about our ability to understand ourselves scientifically and about our ability to know what is “good” or “valid” in terms of science itself rather than relying on some grand narrative about how it happened.
We can’t just look at one thing and say, “This is good, this is bad.” We have to look at the whole system–the way in which we interact with each other, the way in which we deal with problems, etcetera–and try to understand how all these things together create an effective society.
Conclusion
In the end, Skinner’s argument hinges on a simple point: that demarcation is impossible, because there are no absolute criteria for deciding when something is scientific or not. The only thing that can be said about science as such is this: if we don’t like how it’s being done in our community or elsewhere, then we should try to change it. In other words, we should ask ourselves if the way things are done now meets our standards for good science rather than raising up some idealized notion of what “should” be happening with our community’s research program – or even whether there actually IS any idealized notion of what “should” happen! It’s important to remember that any claims about how something should be done as part of science come from within science itself – not outside it (like those made by politicians).